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Monetary Commitment and Fiscal Discretion:  
The Optimal Policy Mix†
By Stefano Gnocchi*
We study a noncooperative policy game between monetary and fiscal 
policy, where only monetary policy can commit to future actions. The 
equilibrium outcome of the game depends on the strategies available 
to the monetary policymaker. If strategies are left unrestricted, 
the central bank can alter the incentives of the fiscal authority in 
a way that replicates the full commitment solution. If the central 
bank cannot commit to respond to fiscal policy, the fiscal authority 
generates fluctuations in government expenditure that undermine the 
stabilization goals of the central bank. (JEL E12, E23, E31, E52, 
E58, E62)
It is natural to argue that monetary and fiscal policymakers do not share the same ability to credibly commit to future policies. In fact, monetary and fiscal policy 
decisions are taken in the context of remarkably different institutional environ-
ments. Central bank independence has contributed to assigning a prominent role to 
transparency and accountability about explicitly stated policy objectives that, in the 
case of inflation targeting central bankers, are defined by statute. In contrast, fiscal 
policy is conducted by political institutions, such as governments and parliaments, 
their tenure is limited in time, and their objectives are not as clearly established as 
the ones for monetary authorities since their mandate is defined by and evaluated 
according to electoral promises. At present, mechanisms designed to contain the 
credibility problems affecting sequential policy making are at best imperfect for 
fiscal policy. Hence, fiscal authorities bear a constraint that central bankers are less 
likely to face. Given such asymmetry, it is interesting to ask whether fiscal discretion 
undermines the objectives pursued by the monetary authority and how it affects the 
optimal monetary response.
In this paper, we investigate the interaction between monetary and fiscal policy 
under alternative commitment regimes. When both authorities have a similar abil-
ity to commit, either because both can commit or because neither cannot commit, 
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monetary policy carries the full burden of stabilization, and fiscal policy is in some 
sense neutral. This is a known result discussed by Galí and Monacelli (2008) and 
Eser, Leith, and Wren-Lewis (2009). The novel contribution of this paper is to con-
sider the case where the central bank never reneges on early promises and the fiscal 
policymaker cannot commit. The equilibrium outcome of the policy game depends 
on the strategies available to the central bank. If these strategies are unrestricted, 
the optimal stabilization plan achieved under commitment and coordination on the 
part of all policymakers (henceforth, full commitment for short) can be sustained, 
even though the fiscal authority cannot commit. In fact, the central bank chooses a 
strategy altering the incentives of the fiscal authority in such a way that it operates as 
if it could commit. A more interesting and, we will argue, more realistic case, is one 
in which the central bank cannot commit to respond to fiscal policy. In such a case, 
the fiscal authority has the incentive to generate higher volatility of government 
expenditure, as compared to the full commitment solution, and the central bank can 
dampen the fluctuations of public spending only by tolerating deviations of inflation 
and/or of the output gap from the full commitment plan.
Our findings contribute to the policy debate and to the literature along several 
dimensions. First, the policy debate about monetary and fiscal interaction has so far 
mostly centered around the inflationary consequences of debt monetization, since 
Sargent and Wallace (1981). We show that even in the absence of public debt, the 
achievement of the central bank’s objectives may be compromised if the mone-
tary authority can commit and the fiscal policymaker cannot. The argument fol-
lows directly from the seminal contribution by Kydland and Prescott (1977). Even 
though both authorities are benevolent and seek to maximize social welfare, they 
solve different problems. The central bank would like to smooth the impact of 
shocks over the cycle and transfer part of their burden to the future. In the event 
of a bad shock generating a short-run stabilization trade-off, committing to future 
deflation and recession allows to reduce current inflation at a lower cost in terms of 
output. This expectation channel improves current stabilization trade-offs. However, 
the fiscal policymaker chooses sequentially and overlooks the benefits of the current 
tightening in terms of past outcomes. Therefore, the use of government expenditure 
to stabilize business cycles, often regarded as complementary to monetary policy, is 
potentially detrimental rather than welfare improving. The final outcome ultimately 
depends on the way the monetary and fiscal authorities interact strategically.
Second, optimal monetary policy is commonly investigated either assuming away 
fiscal policy or under the assumption that a single authority chooses all the policy 
instruments.1 In this paper we argue that when the two authorities do not share the 
same ability to commit, the way they interact needs to be explicitly modelled as 
it is crucial for the policy outcomes and their welfare implications. If one is will-
ing to assume that the central bank perfectly observes the fiscal instruments, the 
optimal strategy prescribes to punish deviations of fiscal policy from the full com-
mitment plan. For instance, the central bank raises the nominal interest rate if the 
1 As a representative sample, see Rotemberg and Woodford (1997); Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999); Galí 
(2003); Galí and Monacelli (2008); Beetsma and Jensen (2005); Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007, 2004); and Leith 
and Von Thadden (2008).
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fiscal  policymaker overexpands government expenditure, so as to let her internalize 
the cost of the deviation through a fall of the output gap. As there exists a credible 
punishment that is tough enough to make any fiscal deviation unprofitable, full com-
mitment is sustained and the threat is never executed at equilibrium. However, reli-
able data on government expenditures are released with nontrivial lags, so that one 
may be willing to assume that public spending is observed with some noise. In such 
a case, discouraging fiscal misbehavior by manipulating the nominal interest rate 
becomes costly. In fact, in order to be credible, the central bank needs to punish every 
deviation, even if it is due to some measurement error. Under noisy information, it is 
optimal to combine two kinds of reaction to fiscal misbehavior. On the one hand, the 
nominal interest rate reacts to fluctuations of government expenditure, but not neces-
sarily as much as predicted by the optimal strategy with perfect information. On the 
other hand, the central bank tolerates deviations of inflation and/or of the output gap 
from the full commitment plan. This is a way to manipulate the fiscal authority’s sta-
bilization trade-off and give her the incentive to dampen fluctuations of government 
expenditure. When the information available to the central bank is sufficiently noisy, 
the monetary authority simply commits to an interest rate path that is not contin-
gent on fiscal policy choices. Therefore, a situation where the central bank does not 
respond to fiscal policy is the optimal limiting behavior when the noise grows large.
Finally, our analysis has some implications for the evaluation of gains from mon-
etary commitment, emphasized by Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), Clarida, Galí, 
and Gertler (1999), and Galí (2003), even in the absence of an inflation bias due to 
steady-state distortions. If the nominal interest rate fails to respond to fiscal misbe-
havior, gains from monetary commitment are considerably reduced. In particular, 
under our baseline parametrization, the welfare gain is half of the one that would be 
observed under commitment from all policymakers.
At present, the literature on policy games between monetary and fiscal policy is 
still rather scant. Our contribution is closely related to Adam and Billi (2008) and 
Dixit and Lambertini (2003). The former consider the case of independent monetary 
and fiscal policymakers both acting under discretion and discuss the desirability of 
installing a conservative central banker, as suggested by Rogoff (1985), in order to 
eliminate the steady-state biases associated with discretion. Adam and Billi (2008) 
also compute the steady-state of a deterministic model with steady-state distortions, 
where the central bank acts under commitment and fiscal policy acts under discre-
tion. However, they restrict to a steady-state analysis. As a consequence, they do not 
discuss the implications of government expenditure volatility for the optimal mon-
etary policy rule and they do not address the stabilization bias issue, as we do here 
along the lines of Galí (2008) or Woodford (2003). Dixit and Lambertini (2003), the 
first authors who take explicitly into account the lack of coordination between the 
two authorities in a game theoretic fashion, also depart from benevolent policymak-
ers. In addition, they address the issue in the context of a static model. Hence, they 
are silent about the monetary policy problem we investigate here.
The paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the model economy and the 
competitive equilibrium. Section II analyzes the benchmark of monetary and  fiscal 
policy coordination. Section III describes the policy game and finds the optimal 
monetary and fiscal policy strategies. Section IV concludes.
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I. The Private Sector Equilibrium
We consider a standard New-Keynesian model as in Galí (2008) or Woodford 
(2003). A closed production economy is populated by infinitely many households 
and firms interacting on goods, labor, and asset markets. In the economy there is 
a perfectly competitive final good sector that produces and sells a homogeneous 
final good to households and to the fiscal policymaker. The final good sector uses 
as input a continuum of imperfectly substitutable intermediate goods, each of them 
produced by a monopolistically competitive firm hiring labor services supplied by 
households. The prices of intermediate goods are set in staggered contracts with ran-
dom duration. Labor markets are monopolistically competitive and the wage mark-
up is assumed to fluctuate exogenously around its mean value to create a meaningful 
policy trade-off between output and inflation stabilization. Financial markets are 
complete.
There are two policymakers: a monetary authority that sets the nominal inter-
est rate and a fiscal authority that is responsible for choosing the level of gov-
ernment expenditure. We assume that the fiscal authority has access to three tax 
instruments: a production subsidy, a labor income subsidy, and a lump sum tax 
that is used to finance expenditure. We also assume that the production and labor 
income subsidies cannot be adjusted in a state-contingent way. Therefore, they 
solely serve the purpose of eliminating steady-state distortions due to monopolis-
tic competition and cannot be used for stabilization policy, whereas the lump-sum 
tax can. Given that consumers are Ricardian, the timing of the lump-sum tax does 
not matter, hence, we assume for concreteness that the fiscal authority balances its 
budget in every period.2
A. Inflation and output Dynamics
We directly report the model in its log-linear version.3 The steady-state of the 
solution to the policy problem coincides with the steady-state of the Pareto efficient 
allocation under all the policy regimes we consider.4 In fact, the fiscal authority is 
allowed to appropriately subsidize labor income and production financing subsidies 
with lump-sum taxation. Let output, government expenditure, and fiscal gaps be 
respectively defined as
(1)  y t =   yt −  _ y t ;   g t =   gt −  _ g t ;   f t =  g t −  y t .
Lower case variables with a hat denote log deviations from the steady-state and 
lower case variables with a bar denote log deviations of the Pareto efficient equilib-
rium.  f t is the percentage deviation from efficiency of government expenditure as a 
2 The paper is not about the fiscal theory of the price level or the interaction between public deficits and mon-
etary policy.
3 Appendix A provides a detailed description of the model, the Pareto efficient allocation, and the log-lineariza-
tion of the first-order conditions about the nonstochastic steady-state.
4 The claim is proved in Appendix C, available upon request.
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fraction of output. One can show that inflation and the output gap are fully described 
by
(2)  π t = β E t { π t+1 } + λ(1 + φ) y t − λ  χ _ 1 − χ  f t + λ μ t w 
(3)  y t =  E t {  y t+1 } +  χ _ 1 − χ  f t −  
χ _ 
1 − χ  E t {   f t+1 } − ( r t −  E t { π t+1 } − r r t ).
Parameters can be conventionally interpreted as follows. β is the discount factor; λ 
is a convolution of parameters defined in Appendix A and is a decreasing function 
of price stickiness; φ is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply; χ param-
eterizes the steady-state share of public spending; while r r t is only a function of 
technology shocks as shown in Appendix A. Equation (2) is a conventional Phillips 
curve, with an additional term −λχ(1 − χ ) −1  f t capturing the impact of government 
expenditure on inflation. Given output, a rise in  f t crowds out private consumption 
and reduces the real wage and the real marginal cost by increasing households’ 
willingness to work. The presence of a cost-push shock,  μ t w , makes it impossible 
to simultaneously stabilize inflation, the output and the fiscal gaps. Equation (3) 
directly follows from the consumption Euler equation and it is a conventional IS 
curve. The fiscal gap appears since consumption has been replaced by using the 
resource constraint.
B. competitive Equilibrium
We define the notion of competitive equilibrium as in Barro (1979) and Lucas 
and Stokey (1983), where decisions of the private sector as well as policies can be 
described by a collection of rules mapping the history of exogenous events into deci-
sions. Let  s t = ( s 0 , … ,  s t ) be the history of exogenous events, where  s t = (r r t ,  μ t w ). 
Define
   0 ≡  {   f t ( s t ),  r t ( s t ),  π t ( s t ),  y t ( s t ) } t≥0 
   t ≡  {  f r ( s r |  s t ),   r r ( s r |  s t ),   π r ( s r |  s t ),   y r ( s r |  s t ) } r≥t .
Hence,   0 is a competitive equilibrium if it satisfies equations (2) and (3) for any  s t .  t is a continuation competitive equilibrium starting at history  s t if it satisfies equa-
tions (2) and (3) for any  s r with r ≥ t and t ≥ 0. Obviously, a continuation competi-
tive equilibrium starting at  s 0 is simply a competitive equilibrium.
II. Coordinated Optimal Policies
We first characterize as a benchmark the case of coordination, where a single 
authority chooses both monetary and fiscal policy, either under commitment or 
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under discretion. A second-order approximation to the utility function about the 
nonstochastic steady-state yields the following welfare function:
(4)  W t = −  1 _2  E t ∑  j=0
∞
 β  j (  ϵ p  _λ  π t+j 2 + (1 + φ) y t+j 2 +  χ _ 1 − χ  f   t+j 2 ) ,
which is assumed to be the objective of the policymaker. The parameter  ϵ p denotes 
the elasticity of substitution across intermediate goods. The optimal plan under 
commitment is a competitive equilibrium maximizing  W 0 . Optimality requires
(5)  ϵ p  π t + Δ y t = 0
(6)  f t +  y t =  g t = 0,
where (5) and (6) are the monetary and the fiscal targeting rules, respectively.5 Then, 
the optimal policy mix under commitment implies that  g t = 0, a case that deserves 
some attention.
DEFINITION 1: If  g t = 0, the fiscal stance is said to be neutral.
Such a situation can be interpreted as if the policymaker focused on public goods 
provision and monetary policy carried the full burden of stabilization. Throughout 
the paper, we refer to the policy defined by (5)–(6) as the full commitment solution.
The optimal plan under discretion is a competitive equilibrium   0 such that any of 
its continuations   t maximize  W t , given the continuation   t+1 . As opposed to com-
mitment, under discretion optimality is defined sequentially and it requires
(7)  ϵ p  π t +  y t = 0,
while equation (6) still holds. By comparing commitment and discretion, a first 
result emerges.
RESULT 1: If monetary and fiscal policy share the same ability to commit, either 
because both can commit or because neither can, the optimal fiscal policy stance is 
neutral.
Hence, we can conclude that symmetry in the policy regime implies full stabiliza-
tion of the government expenditure gap, irrespective of whether policy is conducted 
by committed or discretionary policymakers. Throughout the paper we refer to the 
policy defined by (6) and (7) as the full discretion solution.
5 Equation (5) is the conventional targeting rule extensively discussed in the literature. See Galí (2008) or 
Woodford (2003).
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III. Monetary Commitment and Fiscal Discretion
We now turn to the case where monetary and fiscal policies are conducted by 
two independent authorities. Only the former is able to credibly commit to future 
policies, while fiscal policy is conducted in a discretionary fashion. Hence, at time 
t = 0, monetary policy commits to an interest rate rule maximizing her objective, 
and she sticks to the plan for all t ≥ 0. In contrast, fiscal policy chooses the fiscal 
gap at each point in time.
In this section we proceed as follows. First, we give a formal description of the 
policy game, specifying the strategy space and the equilibrium concept. We follow 
the same formalism as Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe 
(2010), i.e., we allow allocations, prices, and policies to be functions of the history 
of both the aggregate private actions and policies, as well as the history of exog-
enous events. Second, we compute the equilibrium fiscal and monetary strategies. 
Finally, we characterize the allocation in the optimal policy mix.
A. The policy Game
We want to focus on the interaction between the policymakers and we regard pri-
vate agents as a constraint defining the set of implementable allocations. Hence, we 
do not view households and price setters as strategically interesting.6 Consequently, 
there are only two players: the central bank and the fiscal authority.
Timing.—At time t = 0, at a stage that may be viewed as constitutional, the cen-
tral bank chooses an interest rate rule, say  σ r , contingent on all the information 
available, when  r t will have to be set. The rule, once in place, cannot be changed at 
later stages. Below we specify and discuss in detail the information available to each 
player, the class of monetary policy rules we restrict to, as well as the fiscal strategy 
space. Here, we first define the order of moves. After the constitutional stage, for all 
t ≥ 0, events unfold in the following order:
• Shocks occur. They are observed by the players and by the private sector.
•  The fiscal policymaker chooses  f t .
•  The central bank keeps her promise by setting the nominal interest rate  r t 
according to rule  σ r .
•  Inflation and the output gap realize.
The events occurring in any period t can be represented in chronological order 
by  q t = ( s t ,   f t ,  r t ,( π t ,  y t )). Denoting the history of the game as  h t , it follows that 
 h t = ( h t−1 ,  q t ) for t ≥ 1 and  h 0 =  q 0 . Timing makes clear the leadership structure 
6 In contrast, Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (2010) study off-equilibrium behavior of price setters so as to find 
monetary policy strategies uniquely implementing any competitive equilibrium. In order to do so, they construct 
policies discouraging firms’ deviations from the unique bounded solution associated with interest rate rules satisfy-
ing the Taylor principle. To simplify the game, we abstract from this interaction. Simplicity comes at the price of 
ensuring uniqueness of the equilibrium only locally, as it is conventionally done in the monetary literature relying 
on Taylor rules.
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of the game. Because of commitment, the monetary authority does not make any 
relevant choice after the constitutional stage, instead she simply executes plan  σ r . 
Then, the monetary policymaker is the leader of both the private sector and the fiscal 
authority, while the latter only leads households and firms.7
Histories and strategies.—The fiscal policymaker, facing histories 
 h tF = ( h t−1 ,  s t ), chooses her instrument in each period after observing the 
realization of the shocks, in addition to the whole history of the game. 
 h tM = ( h t−1 ,  s t ,  f t ) denotes the information available to the central bank, who exe-
cutes her plan after observing the fiscal gap. Finally, inflation and the output gap 
are contingent on  h tY = ( h t−1 ,  s t ,  f t ,  r t ). Consequently, strategies are sequences 
σ r =  { r t ( h tM ) } t≥0 and  σ f = {  f t ( h tF ) } t≥0 mapping histories into the policy instru- 
ments, while private decisions are represented by some allocation 
rules  σ π = { π t ( h tY ) } t≥0 and  σ y = {  y t ( h tY ) } t≥0 . For any sequence of exogenous events 
from period 0 onward, σ = ( σ f ,  σ r ,  σ π ,  σ y ) naturally induces outcomes as well as 
continuation outcomes starting from any given history  h t−1 . We show a recursion for a 
generic period t. After  s t is realized and observed by the fiscal authority,  f t ( s t |  h t−1 ; σ) =  f t ( h tF ),  f t being obtained from  σ f . Then,  h tM = ( h t−1 ,  s t ,   f t ( s t |  h t−1 ; σ)) and 
 r t ( s t |  h t−1 ; σ) =  r t ( h tM ), where  r t follows from  σ r . Finally, by using  σ π and  σ y , the 
information set  h tY = ( h t−1 ,  s t ,  f t ( s t |  h t−1 ; σ),  r t ( s t |  h t−1 ; σ)) allows to determine 
inflation and output. Similarly, outcomes can be generated for all future possible 
exogenous events  s r with r ≥ t and t ≥ 0, conditionally on the information  h t−1 . 
Hence, we can define continuation outcomes of the game as
( h t−1 ; σ) ≡  {  f t ( s r |  h t−1 ; σ),  r t ( s r |  h t−1 ; σ),  π t ( s r |  h t−1 ; σ),  y t ( s r |  h t−1 ; σ) } r≥t .
Obviously, (σ) is simply the outcome of the game from period 0 onward. Also, we 
can generate continuation outcomes from any of the histories  h tF ,  h tM , and  h tY in the 
same way. For instance, we denote by ( h ty ; σ) the continuation from  h tY . Similarly, 
we define continuation strategies at any history. For example,  σ   f t+1 =  {  f r ( s r |  h tF ) } r≥t+1 
denotes the continuation of the fiscal strategy from  h tF onward. The objective func-
tion  W t ranks continuation outcomes starting from any history. Since the central 
bank commits to  σ r at the constitutional stage, she evaluates alternative outcomes 
according to  W 0 , as opposed to the fiscal policymaker that, acting sequentially, max-
imizes  W t for any possible history  h t−1 .
Equilibrium of the policy Game.—We are finally ready to define the equilibrium 
along the same lines as Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (2010).
DEFINITION 2: An equilibrium of the policy game is a collection of strategies 
and allocation rules  σ ∗ such that: (i ) for any  h tY ,  σ π ∗, and  σ y ∗ induce continuation 
7 Inverting the order of moves within each time period after the constitutional stage would only imply a loss of 
tractability, but it would not change our results. In fact, the central bank could still condition the nominal interest 
rate on  f t−1 . Different is the case of sequential policy making, as in Adam and Billi (2008), where the timing also 
determines the leadership structure, because of lack of commitment on both the monetary and the fiscal side.
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 outcomes ( h tY ; σ) that are continuation competitive equilibria; (ii ) for any  σ r , 
σ f ∗ maximizes  W t at any history  h tF , given the continuation  σ f ∗t+1 ; (iii ) given  σ f ∗ ,  σ r ∗
maximizes  W 0 .8
The equilibrium notion invokes perfection.9 In fact, a Nash equilibrium would 
only require optimality of  σ f ∗ at the equilibrium strategy  σ r ∗, leaving unrestricted 
fiscal behavior off-equilibrium and opening the possibility of noncredible threats.
Monetary and Fiscal strategies.—The following proposition10 shows that one 
can restrict the search of equilibrium strategies to a particular class of policy rules. 
In fact, within that class, for any competitive equilibrium there exists a pair of strate-
gies  σ r and  σ f that can support it.
PROPOSITION 1: Let   0 be a bounded competitive equilibrium and be (  σ π ,   σ y ) 
such that for any  σ r and  σ f  , ( h tY ; σ) is a continuation competitive equilibrium. Let 
r t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ) and  f  t ∗ ( s t ) belong to   0 . For any  γ  f and any  γ π > 1, define monetary 
and fiscal strategies   σ r and   σ f :
(8)  r t ( h tM ) =  r t ∗ ( s t ) +  γ  f (   f t ( h tF ) −  f  t ∗ ( s t )) +  γ π ( π t ( h tY ) −  π t ∗ ( s t ))
(9)  f t ( h tF ) =  F t ( s t ),
where  F t is linear. Then, if  F t =  f  t ∗ for any  s t , there exists a unique bounded outcome  0 (  σ)coinciding with   0 .
The monetary strategy (8) is a Taylor-type rule and is a function of inflation. Solving 
for the interest rate requires finding a fixed point. In fact,  r t ( h tM ) also appears on the 
right-hand side of the equation, because  π t ( h tY ) can be recovered from  σ π ∗ only by 
knowing  r t ( s t |  h t−1 ;   σ). Since the strategy of the fiscal authority is solely a function 
of  s t , the problem greatly simplifies: solving the system of linear difference equa-
tions formed by (2), (3), and (8) does not require to keep track of any additional 
state other than  s t . Hence, the equilibrium nominal interest rate, inflation and the 
output gap can be, respectively, written as  r t ( s t ;   σ),  π t ( s t ;   σ), and  y t ( s t ;   σ). Given the 
simplicity of   σr and   σf , we look for equilibrium strategies in the classes defined by (8) and (9). Our assumptions are not particularly restrictive. In fact, could monetary 
and fiscal strategies be chosen jointly, any competitive equilibrium is attainable, 
including the full commitment solution, which is constrained efficient. In addition, 
we show below that there exists a rule (8) that still implements the full commitment 
allocation at the equilibrium of the policy game, even though the fiscal authority 
acts in a discretionary fashion. More restrictive is the form of the fiscal strategy, 
8 If conditions for a continuation competitive equilibrium hold at any  h tY , then they also hold at  h tF and  h tM . In 
other words, we require (2) and (3) to be satisfied for any history.
9 As Chari and Kehoe (1990) have already emphasized, the distinction between commitment and time-consis-
tent equilibrium is not perfection that is required in both cases; they simply correspond to perfect equilibria of two 
different games.
10 See Appendix B for the proof.
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which is assumed to depend on the history of exogenous events only. However, the 
assumption is standard when modelling discretion, since it excludes a multiplicity 
of reputational equilibria.11
According to Definition 2, under our strategy restrictions the central bank affects 
the policy trade-offs faced by the fiscal authority. It follows that the optimal fiscal 
strategy is a linear function of  s t that, at equilibrium, must depend on the monetary 
rule. By backward induction, the central bank correctly anticipates fiscal behavior 
that in turn affects the optimal strategy  σ r ∗ . A simple example can illustrate how 
the monetary and fiscal authorities interact. Consider  σ r and  σ f , such that (i)  r t ∗ ( s t ), 
 π t ∗ ( s t ) and  f  t ∗ ( s t ) satisfy the full commitment solution; (ii) in contrast,  F t( s t ) =  f  t ∗ ( s t ) for all t ≠ j, while  F j ( s  j ) deviates from  f  j ∗ ( s  j ). Continuation outcomes 
from  h jF onward can be easily computed: for all t > j the full commitment plan is 
enforced, while it can be shown after some algebra12 that in t = j
(10)  r f ≡  ∂ r j  _∂  f j = Ω [ χ _ 1 − χ  γ π λφ +  γ f ] ;  Ω ≡  1 __ 1 +  γ π λ(1 + φ) .
The response of the nominal interest rate feeds into inflation and the output gap 
through the conditions for a competitive equilibrium defining  π j ( s j ,  f j |  s  j−1 ; σ) and 
y j ( s j ,  f j |  s  j−1 ; σ). Therefore, if the fiscal authority sticks to the full commitment 
solution, so do inflation, the output gap, and the nominal interest rate. Otherwise, 
variables deviate by an amount that depends on  r f and  f t : continuation outcomes 
from  h tF are functions of parameters entering the monetary rule, in particular  r t ∗ ( s t ), 
 π t ∗ ( s t ),   f  t ∗ ( s t ), and  r f .
In the next sections, we consider two sets of monetary strategies. We start by 
computing the optimal monetary policy rule within the family defined by (8). We 
refer to these rules as unrestricted monetary strategies. Then, we look for the opti-
mal rule of the form (8) under the additional restriction that  r f = 0. We refer to 
these rules as restricted monetary strategies,13 denoted by  
_ σ  r   . Clearly, unrestricted 
strategies dominate restricted ones in terms of welfare. However, as we will argue 
extensively in Section IIIC, the restricted strategy characterizes the optimal limiting 
behavior in an environment where the central bank observes government expendi-
ture with some noise and when the noise grows large.14
11 See for instance Klein, Krussell, and Ríos-Rull (2008). Instead, Chari and Kehoe (1990) provide an extensive 
discussion about the use of trigger type equilibria in infinite horizon games.
12 Equations (2), (3), and (8) can be solved by taking as given expectations about future variables that in fact 
correspond for all t > j to the commitment outcome, irrespective of the fiscal gap in t = j.
13 Many contributions have analyzed dynamic policy games to tackle the issue of international cooperation. 
Similarly to our restricted strategy case, it is commonly assumed that the domestic central bank takes the instrument 
of the foreign policymaker as given. For a discussion, see Benigno (2002); Benigno and Benigno (2006); Canzoneri 
and Gray (1985); Canzoneri and Henderson (1992); Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (2002); Coenen et al. (2010); and 
Liu and Pappa (2008).
14 The case  γ f = 0 does not yield similar results. In fact, differently from the case  r f = 0, the equilibrium out-
comes depend on  γ π and if that coefficient tends to infinity, full commitment can be implemented. However, such 
a policy is hardly desirable, because it does not provide the correct limiting behavior if the central bank can only 
observe the fiscal gap with some measurement error. In fact, when the inflation coefficient tends to infinity,  r f is 
strictly positive, while we show in Section IIID that it has to be zero if the standard deviation of the measurement 
error grows large.
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Sections IIIB and IIIC present the equilibrium under unrestricted and restricted 
monetary strategies, respectively. In Section IIID, we discuss the relevance of both 
equilibria. Section IIIE concludes with the welfare implications of our analysis.
B. Equilibrium under unrestricted strategies
Given the leadership structure of the game, we first determine the optimal fiscal 
policy for any given monetary policy rule within the class (8). Then, we optimize 
over monetary rules.
Fiscal policy chooses  f t so as to maximize  W t  , subject to (2), (3), and (8), given the 
exogenous stochastic processes and expectations about future variables. Equations 
(2) and (3) are internalized, because the fiscal authority leads the private sector, 
while taking into account (8) guarantees sub-game perfection. Optimal fiscal policy 
under discretion implies the following targeting rule:15
(11)  f t +  y t =  δ r ( y t +  ϵ p  π t );   δ r ≡  (1 + φ)(1 − χ)  __χ  r f − φ.
As comparing (11) to (7) makes it clear, if fluctuations of the government expen-
diture gap16 arise, it must be the case that the monetary strategy implies a deviation 
from the discretionary targeting rule (7). It is possible to show that the right-hand 
side of the targeting rule is proportional to the Lagrange multiplier,  ψ r, t , attached to 
the IS equation in the fiscal policy problem.  ψ r, t can be interpreted as the marginal 
benefit of an exogenous fall in the nominal interest rate evaluated according to the 
fiscal authority’s objective. Equivalently, it is the cost of the monetary stabilization 
plan perceived by the fiscal policymaker. Equation (11) simply states that if the 
central bank deviates from the discretionary targeting rule, the fiscal authority per-
ceives the monetary plan as suboptimal. In particular, if the monetary stance is too 
tight, fiscal policy overexpands, as compared to a neutral fiscal stance. It follows that 
fluctuations of the government expenditure gap, if observed at equilibrium, are due 
to the asymmetry of the policy regime. Hence, we can state:
RESULT 2: If  δ r is different from zero, the optimal fiscal stance is neutral if and only 
if the discretionary monetary targeting rule (7) holds on the equilibrium path.
To establish whether the optimal policy mix involves deviations from a neutral fiscal 
stance, it is necessary to solve for the optimal monetary policy problem. We do it 
in two steps. First, for a given value of  γ f , we compute the competitive equilibrium 
15 The rule (11) implicitly defines the optimal fiscal strategy. In fact, one can find the optimal fiscal strategy after 
using the monetary strategy (8) into (2), (3), and (11) and by solving the system. It is evident from (11) that optimal 
fiscal policy must only depend on  r f , but not on  γ π and  γ f separately. Once  γ π is chosen to ensure local uniqueness, 
an equilibrium can be equivalently supported by selecting either  γ f or  r f .
16 Recall that the government expenditure gap,  g t =  f t +  y t , is the log deviation of public spending from its 
Pareto efficient level.
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maximizing  W 0 , subject to the fiscal targeting rule (11)17. Then, we find the optimal γ f . Conditionally on any  γ f , the targeting rule of the central bank reads as18
(12)  ϵ p  π t +  (1 − χ)(1 + φ)  __   (1 − χ)(1 + φ) + χ δ y Δ y t −  
χ δ y 
  __  (1 − χ)(1 + φ) + χ δ y Δ  f t 
 −  δ π χλ(1 + φ)  __  (1 − χ)(1 + φ) + χ δ y  (  f t +  y t ) = 0.
One can show that by choosing
(13)  γ f =  γ f ∗ ≡  χ _ 1 − χ  [ φ _ 1 + φ ] .
 δ r = 0 for any  γ π . As a consequence, Result 2 does not apply and the fiscal stance 
remains neutral, while equations (11) and (12) reduce to the first-order conditions 
characterizing full commitment. Hence, let   0 c be the competitive equilibrium 
associated to the full commitment solution. Therefore, by Proposition 1, the opti-
mal monetary policy strategy is a rule of the form (8) with  γ f =  γ f ∗ , and functions 
 r t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ),  f  t ∗ ( s t ) belonging to   0 c . The monetary rule and the optimal fiscal strat-
egy  F  ∗ ( s t ) implied by condition (11) define the equilibrium of the policy game. We 
can then state the following result:
RESULT 3: In the optimal policy mix under unrestricted monetary strategies, the 
equilibrium outcome of the game coincides with the competitive equilibrium associ-
ated with the full commitment solution. Hence, the fiscal stance is neutral.
Intuitively, the central bank threatens the fiscal authority with raising the nominal 
interest rate, if government expenditure is higher than the level prescribed by a neu-
tral fiscal stance. Such a reaction on the part of the monetary authority is costly for 
the fiscal policymaker, because it lowers the marginal gain of a fiscal expansion in 
terms of the output gap. Should a deviation occur, the benefit of the deviation would 
be exactly offset by the monetary tightening. Hence, the fiscal stance remains neu-
tral on the equilibrium path.
C. Equilibrium under restricted strategies
Under restricted strategies, the central bank commits to (8) after imposing the 
additional restriction  r f = 0, which, by equation (10), is equivalent to setting
(14)  γ f =  γ f ∗∗ ≡ −  χ _ 1 − χ  γ π λφ.
17 In Appendix B we prove that it is immaterial whether the central bank internalizes the targeting rule (11) or 
the optimal fiscal strategy  F  ∗ of the form (9).
18 See equation (B12) in Appendix B for a definition of the coefficients.
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Under restricted strategies, the monetary rule does prescribe the same nominal inter-
est rate path, irrespective of whether the fiscal authority follows the plan  f t ∗ ( s t ). The 
optimal targeting rules can be found by substituting the restriction on  γ f into equa-
tions (11) and (12), since they are optimal for any  γ f . We obtain
(15)  f t +  y t = −φ( y t +  ϵ p  π t )
(16)  ϵ p  π t + Δ y t = χ(1 + φ  ϵ p λ) (  f t +  y t ) − χ (  f t−1 +  y t−1 ) .
Let   0 D be the competitive equilibrium satisfying equations (15) and (16). Therefore, 
by Proposition 1, the optimal monetary policy strategy is a rule of the form (8) with 
γ f =  γ f ∗∗ , and functions  r t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ),  f  t ∗ ( s t ) belonging to   0 D . The monetary rule and 
the optimal fiscal strategy  F ∗ ( s t ) implied by condition (15) define the equilibrium of 
the policy game. Since  δ r is nonzero, by Result 2, the fiscal stance is not necessarily 
neutral. If  g t = 0 indeed, (16) reduces to
(17)  ϵ p  π t + Δ y t = 0,
which may differ from the discretionary monetary targeting rule (7). This is because 
the two policymakers solve different problems even though they are both benevo-
lent. The central bank would like to smooth the impact of shocks over the cycle and 
transfer part of their burden to the future. In fact, in case a bad (good) shock hits, 
it is welfare improving to smooth its impact on output and inflation over time. By 
committing to future deflation (inflation), current inflation falls (rises), given output, 
through the effect on expected inflation, and part of the impact of the current shock 
is transferred to the future. This expectation channel improves the trade-off between 
inflation and output gap stabilization. However, the fiscal policymaker does not take 
into account the benefits of the current tightening in terms of past outcomes, since 
she moves sequentially. Then, fiscal policy tries to bring the policy stance in line 
with her own cost-benefit evaluation, by deviating from g = 0. As a consequence, 
the central bank has to trade-off deviations of inflation and the output gap from 
the full commitment solution against deviations of public expenditure from Pareto 
efficiency. Hence, discretionary fiscal policy worsens the conventional trade-off 
between inflation and output gap stabilization faced by the monetary authority.
It is interesting to see how monetary policy optimally reacts to deviations from a 
neutral fiscal stance. Under restricted strategies, the central bank does not threaten to 
raise the nominal interest rate in response to the fiscal gap. Rather, she manipulates 
the trade-offs faced by the fiscal authority through the equilibrium play. In fact, the 
central bank internalizes the misbehavior of the fiscal policymaker and she chooses 
to deviate from the rule that would be implemented under commitment and perfect 
coordination. This is because the monetary authority is willing to accept higher 
volatility of inflation and/or output to give the fiscal authority the incentive to con-
tain the volatility of expenditure. As a consequence, coherently with the reaction 
function of the fiscal policymaker, optimal monetary policy targets deviations from 
a neutral fiscal stance; larger deviations call for higher inflation or larger output gap. 
The optimal policy is inertial; lagged fiscal variables appear in the targeting rule. 
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Then, for given future fiscal gaps, the central bank commits to tighten future mon-
etary policy in the event of an increase of the current fiscal gap. This improves the 
current trade-off by reducing expected future inflation.
There is only one special case when the full commitment solution can be imple-
mented despite fiscal discretion. In the absence of cost-push shocks, the Pareto effi-
cient allocation is feasible, so it must also be optimal. Consequently, the  commitment 
and the discretionary monetary targeting rules coincide on the equilibrium path and 
the right-hand side of equation (15) is compatible with the left-hand side of equation 
(16) if  g t = 0. Therefore, we can state the following result.
RESULT 4: In the optimal policy mix under restricted strategies, the fiscal stance is 
neutral if and only if the pareto efficient allocation is feasible.
Impulse response functions to a wage mark-up shock confirm the intuition grasped 
by looking at the targeting rules. Figures 1 and 2 display the response of endog-



















































Figure 1. Impulse Responses under the Full Commitment Regime 
 and under the Optimal Restricted Strategy, Respectively Denoted by “MCFC” and “MCFD”
notes: The serial correlation of the shock has been set to 0. Parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.
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labelled as “MCFC,” and discretionary fiscal policy with monetary commitment, 
labelled as “MCFD.” Structural parameters are the same as in Galí and Monacelli 
(2008) and they are reported in Table 1. φ is set equal to three, implying a labor 
supply elasticity of one-third. The elasticity of substitution among goods and labor 
types  ϵ p and  ϵ w are equal to 6, which is consistent with average mark-ups of 20 
percent. θ and β are, respectively, set to 0.75 and 0.99. The steady-state share of 
government spending in output, χ, is parameterized to 0.25, the average of final 
government consumption for the Euro Area.
Wage mark-up shocks are assumed to follow an autoregressive process:
  μ t+1 w =  ρ u  μ t w +  ε t+1, u .
The standard deviation of  ε t, u is chosen in such a way that the standard deviation 
of the cost-push term appearing in the Phillips curve, λ μ t w , is equal to 1 percent. 
Figures 1 and 2 report the case of a wage mark-up shock with correlations equal to 
















































Figure 2. Impulse Responses under the Full Commitment Regime 
 and under the Optimal Restricted Strategy, Respectively Denoted by “MCFC” and “MCFD”
notes: The serial correlation of the shock has been set to 0.95. Parameters are calibrated as in Table 1.
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inflation and the output gap. Hence, because of the concavity of the welfare func-
tion, it is optimal to temporarily accept both some positive inflation and a negative 
output gap. In addition, in the case of commitment and perfect coordination, the 
fiscal stance remains neutral. In fact, the government expenditure gap is closed and 
the fiscal gap fluctuates one-to-one with the output gap. Instead, under fiscal dis-
cretion the government expenditure gap responds to wage mark-up shocks. This 
fact worsens the trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization faced by 
the central bank. A committed central bank could still eliminate fiscal overreac-
tion completely by behaving as a discretionary monetary authority. Though feasible, 
this policy would be sub-optimal, therefore a combination of positive inflation, out-
put gap and fiscal gap variability is preferred. In fact, the monetary authority gives 
up the active use of the expectation channel to some extent so as to contain fiscal 
misbehavior. Equilibrium fluctuations represent the maximum deviation from full 
commitment that the monetary authority is willing to accept so as to reduce public 
spending variability. Finally, although the fiscal rule targets contemporaneous vari-
ables, monetary policy induces inertia by suitably choosing her policy instrument. 
This is evident from Figure 1. Since the cost-push shock is serially uncorrelated, 
inertia must be entirely generated by monetary policy. This is a well-established 
result since Woodford (2003) and Galí (2008).
D. restricted versus unrestricted strategies
We now discuss the economic relevance of the equilibria computed above, which 
are the outcomes of alternative reactions on the part of the central bank to fiscal 
misbehavior.
In the case of restricted strategies, we follow the classic Ramsey (1927) approach, 
where the optimal plan prescribes a nominal interest rate path that is not contin-
gent on the fiscal authority’s actions. We find that the central bank chooses to devi-
ate from the full commitment solution in order to manipulate the fiscal authority’s 
stabilization trade-off and contain the inefficiently high volatility of government 
expenditure.
In the case of unrestricted strategies, we follow the sophisticated policy approach 
emphasized by Chari and Kehoe (1990) and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (2010)
which differs from the optimal Ramsey plan in a crucial way. A sophisticated mon-
etary rule indeed prescribes an interest rate path for any possible history, including 
those that are off equilibrium. Equivalently, the central bank threatens to punish 
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interest rate. Since there exists a sufficiently tough punishment that makes any fiscal 
deviation unprofitable, the full commitment solution is sustained and the threat is 
never executed at equilibrium.
Clearly, unrestricted strategies dominate restricted ones in terms of welfare, given 
that the associated equilibrium outcome is constrained efficient. However, one can 
show that if the central bank observes the fiscal gap with some noise, the restricted 
strategy is the optimal limiting behavior when the noise grows large.
We model imperfect information by assuming some measurement error accord-
ing to
(18)  f  t o =  f t +  ε tM ,
where  f   o and f are respectively the observed and the actual fiscal gap, while  ε tM is a 
zero mean measurement error that is serially uncorrelated, with standard deviation 
denoted by  σ e . We need to redefine the game accordingly. Hence, let the sequence 
of events be  q t = ( s t ,  f t ,  ε tM ,  r t ,( π t ,  y t )) and the information sets be  h tF = ( h t−1 ,  s t ), 
h tM = ( h t−1 ,  s t ,   f  t o ) and  h tY = ( h t−1 ,  s t ,  f t ,  ε tM ,  r t ). Obviously, the error does not enter 
the history of the central bank,19 while we still assume that the private sector has 
perfect information. We can then restate20 Proposition 1.
PROPOSITION 2: Implementation under Imperfect Information. Let (  σπ ,   σy ) be 
such that for any  σ r and  σ f , ( h tY ; σ) is a continuation competitive equilibrium. Let 
f  t ∗ ( s t ),  r t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ), and  y t ∗ ( s t ) form a competitive equilibrium. For any  γ f and any γ π > 1, define monetary and fiscal strategies   σr and   σf :
(19)  r t ( h tM ) =  r t ∗ ( s t ) +  γ f  (  f  t o ( h tF ) −  f  t ∗ ( s t )) +  γ π ( E t ( π t ( h tY ) |  h tM ) −  π t ∗ ( s t ))
(20)  f t ( h tF ) =  F t ( s t ).
Then, if  F t =  f  t ∗ for any  s t , the unique bounded outcome of the game is
(21)  r t =  r t ∗ +  r f   ε tM 
(22)  y t =  y t ∗ −  r f  ε tM 
(23)  π t =  π t ∗ − λ(1 + φ) r f  ε tM .
Recall that the coefficient  r f has been previously defined by equation (10). Notice 
that the monetary rule differs from the one under perfect information in two respects. 
First, the interest rate responds to the observed fiscal gap. Moreover, we replace 
inflation by its expectation conditional on  h tM to emphasize that the inflation rate 
inferred from (2) and (3), conditionally on the observed fiscal gap, may differ from 
19 We are implicitly assuming that the central bank cannot perfectly see other aggregate variables that would 
allow her to infer  f t with certainty.
20 See Appendix B for the proof.
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actual inflation. According to Proposition 2, if the measurement error converges to 
zero, the outcome of the game converges to any desired competitive equilibrium, as 
in the case of unrestricted strategies under perfect information. Hence, by substitut-
ing outcomes, we can conveniently rewrite the objective function as the sum of two 
independent components
(24)  W t ( s t ,  ε tM ; σ) =  W t p ( s t ; σ) −  1 _2  
 σ e 2  r f 2 (1 + φ)  
1 − β [ ϵ p λ(1 + φ) + 1],
where  W t p ( s t ; σ) is the value of the objective function at the outcome of the game 
under perfect information. Since  r f and  ε f are given for the fiscal policymaker, it 
immediately follows that if  σ f is optimal conditionally on  r f under perfect informa-
tion, it must also be optimal under imperfect information. We can apply the same 
decomposition (24) at time t = 0 to reformulate the optimal monetary policy prob-
lem. Therefore, one can first find the best policy under perfect information, condition-
ally on any  γ f , by solving for the competitive equilibrium satisfying (11) and (12). 
This operation determines optimal parameters  r t ∗ ( s t ;  γ f ),  π t ∗ ( s t ;  γ f ) and  f  t ∗ ( s t ;  γ f ). 
Finally, one can solve for the optimal monetary strategy by maximizing  W 0 over  γ f , 
where  W 0 p is evaluated at the perfect information outcome. It is evident that under 
imperfect information the central bank faces an additional trade-off. In fact, as long 
as  σ e > 0, welfare losses due to the measurement error can be reduced by weaken-
ing the response of the nominal interest rate to the fiscal gap. Equation (24) implies 
that such losses are zero in the case of restricted strategies. On the other hand, we 
showed above that only unrestricted strategies allow to implement the constrained 
efficient allocation. In this respect, lowering  r f is welfare detrimental. Figure 3 dis-
plays the optimal response  r f as a function of the standard deviation of the measure-
ment error, in the case of the parametrization displayed in Table 1. When the error is 
sufficiently volatile, the restricted strategy is the optimal one.
To conclude, if the central bank can perfectly observe the fiscal gap, she can 
implement full commitment by threatening to vary the nominal interest rate enough 
to discourage deviations from a neutral fiscal stance. Since the threat is credible, it 
does not need to be executed at equilibrium. However, under imperfect information, 
in order to be credible, the monetary authority needs to punish every deviation, 
even if it is due to measurement error. Hence, discouraging fiscal misbehavior by 
varying the nominal interest rate becomes costly. The optimal monetary policy is 
then to accept some extra volatility of inflation and the output gap. We view the 
case of imperfect observability of the fiscal gap as a plausible one. Reliable data on 
government expenditure are released indeed with non trivial lags, moreover public 
spending and output need to be observed in deviation from their efficient levels. 
Therefore, we conclude that the model with imperfect information rationalizes the 
case of restricted strategies, which give the correct limiting behavior.
E. second Moments and Welfare Implications
We conclude our analysis by studying second moments and welfare, conditionally 
on wage mark-up shocks, under two alternative policy regimes: full commitment, 
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or equivalently, the equilibrium under unrestricted strategies; and the equilibrium 
under restricted strategies. The purpose of the exercise is to show that if the central 
bank does not condition the nominal interest rate on the fiscal gap, lack of commit-
ment on the fiscal side significantly reduces gains from monetary commitment.
Table 2 reports the standard deviations of the output gap, inflation and the fiscal 
gap under both regimes. Keeping in mind that the variance of the shock has been 
normalized, second moments show that the solution to the trade-offs depends on 
ρ u . If the shock is purely transitory, it is worth using the expectation channel to 
smooth the shock. Furthermore, fiscal overreaction is less persistent and, therefore, 
less harmful. As a result, monetary policy gives up on fiscal gap stabilization and 
focuses on inflation. In contrast, when the shock is persistent, smoothing the shock 
is less of an issue and fiscal overexpansion is strong and long lasting. It follows that 
the central bank gives up on inflation and contains g by over-stabilizing output, as 
compared to the full commitment solution, and pleasing the fiscal policymaker.
Table 3 analyzes gains from monetary commitment. The two columns consider 
the cases of a wage mark-up shock with serial correlations equal to 0.95 and 0, 
respectively. The first three rows report welfare under full commitment, fiscal dis-
cretion with monetary commitment and full discretion. The fourth one displays the 
change in welfare resulting from implementing a full commitment regime starting 
from discretion on the part of all policymakers. Row 5 shows the change in welfare 









Figure 3. The Graph Displays the Optimal  r f as a Function of the Standard Deviation 
of the Measurement Error
note: Parameters are chosen as in Table 1.
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resulting from implementing monetary commitment under fiscal discretion starting 
from discretion on the part of all policymakers. Finally, the last row computes the 
fraction of gains from monetary commitment under fiscal discretion, as compared 
to the full commitment case. It is possible to see that gains are only half of the ones 
obtained when the fiscal authority is also committing.
IV. Conclusion
This paper considers a noncooperative game between monetary and fiscal policy, 
where the fiscal policymaker cannot commit to future policies. We find that should 
the monetary authority fail to provide the fiscal policymaker with the appropriate 
incentives, fluctuations of public spending undermine the stabilization goals of the 
central bank.
Two possible applications of our findings are worth exploring.
On the one hand, it is not obvious that government expenditure is the proper 
instrument to deal with asymmetric shocks in currency areas as a substitute to the 
nominal exchange rate. It may also be the case that the use of discretionary public 
spending for stabilization purposes is welfare reducing, as compared to a situation 
where the role of governments is limited to the efficient provision of public goods.
On the other hand, a richer fiscal policy problem may allow us to gain addi-
tional insights. At present, the analysis is confined to the case of a balanced bud-
get and lump sum taxation. However, distortionary taxation and debt are likely to 
make the problems arising from sequential policymaking harsher. Adam and Billi 
(2010) represent a step forward in this direction. Interestingly, noncooperation and 
lack of fiscal commitment may provide a rationale for budget rules as long as the 
Table 2—Percentage Standard Deviations
Output gap Fiscal gap Inflation
 ρ = 0  ρ = 0.95  ρ = 0  ρ = 0.95  ρ = 0  ρ = 0.95 
Fiscal discretion,  r f = 0 1.69 2.37 2.51 5.55 0.29 0.23
Full commitment 1.56 2.60 1.56 2.60 0.31 0.10
Table 3—Welfare Analysis
ρ = 0.95 ρ = 0 
Full commitment 0.15 0.08
Fiscal discretion and monetary commitment,  r f = 0 0.18 0.09
Full discretion 0.21 0.10
(1) Gains from monetary commitment, fiscal commitment 0.06 0.02
(2) Gains from monetary commitment, fiscal discretion 0.03 0.01
Ratio of (2) to (1) 0.5 0.5 
note: Welfare losses are measured in consumption equivalents under all regimes, i.e., the percentage of efficient 
steady state consumption that households would be willing to give up in order to switch from the actual regime to 
the efficient allocation.
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volatility of public spending translates into volatility of debt through tax smooth-
ing. These rules are widely implemented in the United States, the United Kingdom, 
and the European Union. The effectiveness and the optimality of budget rules have 
been the subject of an extensive discussion in the fiscal policy literature. Alesina 
and Tabellini (1990), Andres and Domenech (2006), Diaz-Gimenez et al. (2008), 
Canova and Pappa (2006), Galí and Perotti (2003), and Fatas and Mihov (2006) 
are just a sample. However, none of those contributions focuses on the problems 
that lack of coordination between monetary and fiscal authorities may create, and 
none of the authors relate them to fiscal institutions. This is a question left for future 
research.
Appendix A: The Model
A. Firms
There is a perfectly competitive firm producing a single homogeneous good 
according to the following CES production function
(A1)  Y t =  [ ∫ 0 1  Y t ( j )   ϵ p − 1 _ ϵ p    dj ]   ϵ p  _  ϵ p − 1  ,
where  ϵ p > 1 is the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods  Y t ( j ). Let 
p t ( j ) be the price of good j ∈ [0, 1], then cost minimization implies that the price of 
the final good Y equals the marginal cost so that
(A2)  p t =  [ ∫ 0 1 p t ( j ) 1− ϵ p  dj ]  1 _ 1− ϵ p   .
Each good j is produced by a monopolistically competitive firm with a constant 
return to scale technology
(A3)  Y t ( j) =  A t  n t, j ,
and productivity denoted by  A t . Prices are staggered à la Calvo and in every period 
firms face a constant probability 1 − θ of changing the price. The effective labor 
input is a CES aggregator of the quantity hired of differentiated labor services  n t, j (i)
(A4)  n t, j =  [ ∫ 0 1  n t, j (i )   ϵ w, t −1 _ ϵ w, t    di ]   ϵ w, t  _  ϵ w, t −1  .
Wages are set monopolistically by households, and they are taken as given by firms 
who do not have market power on the labor market.  ϵ w, t > 1 is representing the 
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elasticity of substitution among labor types and we assume it to be time varying 
and stochastic so as to generate exogenous fluctuations of the wage mark-up. The 
aggregate wage is defined as
(A5)  W t =  [ ∫ 0 1 W t (i ) 1− ϵ w, t  di ]  1 _ 1− ϵ w, t   ,
and it has the property that the minimum cost of a unit of composite labor input 
 n t is  W t .
B. Households
Each household i consumes private and public goods and sells differentiated 
labor services to firms. Preferences are described by the following utility function
(A6)  u 0 i =  E 0 ∑  
t=0
∞
 β t ( (1 − χ) log  c t i + χ log  G t −  ( n t i) 1+φ  _1 + φ ) .
 c t i is bought at the market price  p t ,  G t is the public expenditure chosen by the fiscal 
policymaker and  n t i represents hours worked. The period budget constraint reads as
(A7)  p t c t i +  E t   {  Q t, t+1  D t+1 i } ≤  D t i + (1 +  τ w ) W t i  n t i +  T  t i.
 W t i  n t i is nominal labor income,  τ w is a proportional subsidy to labor income and 
 T t i are lump-sum taxes. In addition, households hold a portfolio including state con-
tingent assets and shares in domestic firms.  D t+1 i denotes the nominal payoff of the 
portfolio in t + 1,  Q t, t+1 is the one-period ahead stochastic discount factor and it 
is such that  E t  { Q t, t+1 } r t = 1, where  r t is the risk-free nominal interest rate factor. 
Optimization requires
(A8)   W t  _ p t  =  
 ε w, t 
 __ ( ε w, t − 1)(1 +  τ w )  
 n t φ  c t  _
1 − χ 
(A9) 1 = β E t   {   c t  _  c t+1  r t   p t  _  p t+1 } ,
where index i has been dropped because we are interested in a symmetric equilib-
rium. We define the wage mark-up as
(A10)  μ t w =  log (  ε w, t  __ ( ε w, t − 1)(1 +  τ w )) ,
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so that equation (A8) becomes
(A11)   W t  _ p t  = exp { μ t 
w }   n t 
φ c t  _
1 − χ .
C. Market clearing
The clearing of all goods markets implies
(A12)  Y t =  c t +  G t .
The aggregate production function is given by
(A13)  Y t  Z t =  A t   n t ,
where  Z t is defined as
(A14)  Z t =  ∫ 0 1   Y t (  j ) _ Y t  dj,
and represents a measure of relative price dispersion. It can be proved that log(Z ) is 
a function of the cross-sectional variance of relative prices and it is of second order. 
 n t is the aggregate labor input
(A15)  n t =  ∫ 0 1  n t, j dj.
D. The pareto optimum
Pareto efficiency requires the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and 
private consumption and between leisure and public consumption to equalize the 
corresponding marginal rate of transformation, this implying
(A16)  A t =  n t φ   c t  _ 1 − χ =  n t φ  
 G t  _χ .
The goods market clearing condition and the aggregate production function are used 
to recover the efficient allocation
(A17)  _ n t = 1;  _ Y t =  A t ;  _ c t = (1 − χ) A t ;  _ G t = χ A t .
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E. Derivation of Equation (2)
Profit maximization in the intermediate goods sector determines the optimal price 
p t ∗ charged by reoptimizing firms
(A18)  ∑  
T=0
∞
 θ T E t {  Q t, t+T Y t+T ( j ) [ p t ∗ −   ϵ p  _  ϵ p − 1 (1 −  τ  p )   W t+T  _ A t+T  ] } = 0,
where  τ  p is a subsidy to production. Log-linearizing (A18) and (A2) about the non-
stochastic steady-state allows to recover a standard Phillips curve
(A19)  π t = β E t { π t+1 } + λ(  wt −  a t ),
where   wt represents the real wage in log-deviation from the steady-state, 
 π t = log  p t − log  p t−1 ,  a t = log  A t and λ is a convolution of deep parameters
 λ =  (1 − θ)(1 − θβ)  __θ .
Labor supply (A11) in its log-linear form reads as
(A20)   wt = φ  nt +   ct +  μ t w ,
while log-linearizing the resource constraint (RC) and the production function 
(APF) yields
(A21)   yt = (1 − χ)  ct + χ   gt =  a t +   nt ,
so that the real marginal cost,   wt −  a t , can be rewritten as a function of output, 
government expenditure, TFP, and wage mark-up shocks after using (A21) in (A20)
(A22)   wt −  a t =  ( φ +  1 _ 1 − χ)   yt − (1 + φ) a t −  χ _ 1 − χ   gt +  μ t w .
Hence, it follows that
(A23)  _ w t −  a t =  ( φ +  1 _ 1 − χ)  _ y t − (1 + φ) a t −  χ _ 1 − χ  _ g t +  μ t w ,
where lower case variables with a bar denote the value of the variable computed at 
the Pareto efficient allocation in log deviations from the steady-state. Log deviations 
of the real marginal cost have to be zero at Pareto efficiency. Then, it must be the 
case that
(A24)   wt −  a t =  ( φ +  1 _ 1 − χ)  y t −  χ _ 1 − χ  g t ,
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which is easily obtained by subtracting the right hand side of (A23) from the right-
hand side of (A22) and using definitions stated in (1). For convenience, we want to 
express the Phillips curve as a function of the fiscal gap, hence (A24) becomes
(A25)   wt −  a t =  ( 1 + φ )  y t −  χ _ 1 − χ  f t +  μ t w 
by using the definition of  f t . (A25) and (A19) imply the Phillips curve (2) reported 
in the text.
F. Derivation of Equation (3)
Log linearizing the Euler equation one can obtain
(A26)  c t =  E t  c t+1 − { r t −  E t  π t+1 − r  r t }
after defining  c t =   ct −  _ c t  r t = log  r t , ρ = −log  β and r r t = ρ +  E t Δ a t+1 . It 
follows from the resource constraint (A21) and the definition of  f t that
(A27)  c t = (1 − χ ) −1 y t − χ(1 − χ ) −1 g t =  y t − χ(1 − χ ) −1 f t .
Equations (A27) and (A26) imply the IS (3) stated in the text.
Appendix B: Proofs and Derivations of Results Stated in Section IV
A. proposition 1
Let  {   ˜ f    t ∗( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ),  ˜ y t ∗ ( s t ),  r t ∗ ( s t ) } be a competitive equilibrium. Define monetary 
and fiscal strategies { σ r  ,  σ f } as
(B1)  r t =  r t ∗ ( s t ) +  γ f (  f t −  f  t ∗ ( s t )) +  γ π ( π t −  π t ∗ ( s t ))
(B2)  f t =  f  t ∗ ( s t )
for any  γ f and any  γ π > 1. Then, the unique solution to equations (2), (3), (B1), 
and (B2) is  {   f  t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ),  y t ∗ ( s t ),  r t ∗ ( s t ) } .
PROOF:
By definition of the competitive equilibrium,  {   f  t ∗ ,  π t ∗ ,  y t ∗ ,  r t ∗ } satisfies equations (2) and (3). Then, it must be true that for any collection  {   f t ,  π t ,  y t ,  r t } satisfying (2), (3), (B1), and (B2), the following system holds
(B3)  π t −  π t ∗ = β E t ( π t+1 −  π t+1 ∗ ) + λ(1 + φ)( y t −  y t ∗ )
212 AMErIcAn EconoMIc JournAL: MAcroEconoMIcs AprIL 2013
(B4)  y t −  y t ∗ =  E t ( y t+1 −  y t+1 ∗ ) −  [ γ π ( π t −  π t ∗ ) −  E t ( π t+1 −  π t+1 ∗ ) ] .
Equivalently,
(B5)  [    y t −  y t ∗            π t −  π t ∗   ] = ΩA E t  [    y t+1 −  y t+1 ∗               π t+1 −  π t+1 ∗   ] ,
where
(B6) Ω =  ( 1 +  γ π λ(1 + φ) ) −1 
(B7) A =  [  1  λ(1 + φ)    1 −  γ π β  β + λ(1 + φ)   ] .
The system has a unique solution if and only if the eigenvalues of matrix A are both 
inside the unit circle. As Bullard and Mitra (2002) show, this is the case if and only 
if  γ π > 1. Hence,  γ π > 1 guarantees that  y t =  y t ∗ and  π t =  π t ∗ is the unique solution 
for any  s t . It also follows by (B1) that  r t =  r t ∗ , while  f t =  f  t ∗ because of (B2).
B. The Fiscal policy problem
Fiscal policy maximizes  W t in each period t, subject to (2), (3), and (8), given 
expectations about future variables and exogenous stochastic processes. First-order 
conditions with respect to inflation, output gap and fiscal gap are respectively given 
by
(B8)   ϵ p  _λ π t +  ψ π, t +  γ π  ψ r, t = 0
(B9) (1 + φ) y t − λ(1 + φ) ψ π, t +  ψ r, t = 0
(B10)  χ _ 
1 − χ  f t + λ  
χ _ 
1 − χ  ψ π, t +  ( γ f −  χ _ 1 − χ)  ψ r, t = 0,
together with the constraints (2) and (3), where  ψ π, t and  ψ r, t are the Lagrange mul-
tipliers associated to (2) and (3), respectively. Equation (B10) can be equivalently 
rewritten as
(B11)  f t +  δ π  π t +  δ y y t = 0,
being  δ π and  δ y defined as
(B12)  δ y = (1 + φ) [ 1 −  (1 − χ) _χ  r f ] ;   δ π =  ϵ p ( δ y − 1).
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After some algebraic manipulation, equation (B11) can be expressed as in (11). The 
rule (B11) implicitly defines the optimal fiscal strategy that can be found after using 
(8) into (2), (3), and (11) and solving
(B13)   B  [    y t   π t  f t ] = D E t  [    y t+1   π t+1  f t+1 ] +  [ −( r t ∗ ( s t ) −  γ π  π t ∗ ( s t ) −  γ f  f  t ∗ ( s t ) − r r t )    λ μ t w  0  ] ,
where matrices B and D are
(B14) B =  [ 1     −λ(1 + φ)   δ y     γ π   1   δ π   −  χ _ 1 − χ +  γ f    λ  χ _ 1 − χ  1   ] 










−  χ _ 1 − χ 
 0 
0
  ] .
If a unique locally stable solution to the system exists,21 then the optimal fiscal strat-
egy  F ∗ ( s t ) ≡  f t ( r t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ),   f  t ∗ ( s t ),  s t ; σ ) is a linear function that only depends on 
the history of the exogenous events. The following proposition guarantees that if the 
fiscal policymaker plays her optimal strategy, the central bank can always choose a 
monetary policy rule that implements any competitive equilibrium satisfying (11). 
Obviously, any competitive equilibrium that does not satisfy (11) cannot satisfy  F  ∗ 
and thus cannot be an equilibrium of the policy game either.
PROPOSITION A: Let   0 be a bounded competitive equilibrium satisfying (11) and 
be (  σπ ,   σy ), such that for any  σ r and  σ f   , ( h tY ; σ) is a continuation competitive 
equilibrium. If (a) fiscal policy is optimal, i.e.,  f t ( s t ; σ) =  F  ∗ ( s t ), (b)  F  ∗ is unique, (c) the monetary policy strategy is of the form (8), with  r t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ), and  f  t ∗ ( s t ) 
belonging to   0 , then there exists a unique bounded outcome   0 coinciding with   0 
and  F ∗ =  f t ∗ ( s t ).
21 Uniqueness is checked by resorting to numerical analysis of the eigenvalues of the matrix  B −1 D.
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PROOF:
By assumption (c),  r t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ), and  f  t ∗ ( s t ) satisfy equations (2), (3), and (11). 
Any outcome of the game  {   f t ,  π t ,  y t ,  r t } satisfies (2), (3), (8), as well as (11) by 
assumption (a) and by the definition of  F  ∗ . Hence, the following system must hold
(B16) B  [   y t −  y t ∗   π t −  π t ∗  f t −  f  t ∗  ] = D  E t  [   y t+1 −  y t+1 ∗    π t+1 −  π t+1 ∗  f t+1 −  f  t+1 ∗  ] ,
where matrices B and D have been defined above. The system has as a unique solu-
tion,  y t =  y t ∗ ,  π t =  π t ∗ and  f t =  f  t ∗ , if and only if the eigenvalues of the matrix  B −1 D 
are inside the unit circle, which is true whenever the optimal fiscal strategy is unique. 
Hence, by assumption b) there must exist a unique bounded outcome   0 coinciding 
with   0 and  F t ∗ =  f  t ∗ .
This proposition guarantees that it is immaterial whether the central bank inter-
nalizes the targeting rule or the optimal fiscal strategy of the form (FPS). Hence, in 
the main text we only look at the fiscal targeting rule that lends itself to a straight-
forward interpretation.
C. The Monetary policy problem
The first-order conditions with respect to inflation, output gap, and fiscal gap are 
respectively given by
(B17)   ϵ p  _λ  π t + Δ  ξ π, t +  δ π  ξ  f, t = 0
(B18) (1 + φ) y t − λ(1 + φ) ξ π, t +  δ y ξ  f, t = 0
(B19)  χ _ 
1 − χ  f t + λ  
χ _ 
1 − χ  ξ π, t +  ξ  f, t = 0,
where  ξ π, t ,  ξ f, t are the Lagrange multipliers associated with (2) and (B11) respec-
tively. (B18) and (B19) allow to express lagrange multipliers as functions of output 
and fiscal gaps
(B20)   ξ π, t =  (1 − χ)(1 + φ)  __   λ [ (1 − χ)(1 + φ) + χ δ y ] y t −  
χ δ y 
  __  λ [ (1 − χ)(1 + φ) + χ δ y ]  f t 
(B21)  ξ f, t = −  χ(1 + φ)  __ (1 − χ)(1 + φ) + χ δ y ( y t +  f t ).
Substituting back into (B17) yields the monetary policy rule (12) in the text.
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D. proposition 2
Implementation under Imperfect Information. Let (  σπ ,   σy ) be such that for any 
σ r and  σ f    , ( h tY ; σ) is a continuation competitive equilibrium. Let  f  t ∗ ( s t ),  r t ∗ ( s t ),  π t ∗ ( s t ) and  y t ∗ ( s t ) form a competitive equilibrium. For any  γ f and any  γ π > 1, define 
monetary and fiscal strategies   σr and   σf :
(B22)  r t ( h tM ) =  r t ∗ ( s t ) +  γ f (  f  t o ( h tF ) −  f  t ∗ ( s t )) +  γ π ( E t ( π t ( h tY ) |  h tM ) −  π t ∗ ( s t ))
(B23)  f t ( h tF ) =  F t( s t ).
Then, if  F t( s t ) =  f  t ∗ ( s t ), the unique bounded outcome of the game is
(B24)  r t =  r t ∗ +  r f  ε tM 
(B25)  ˜  yt =  ˜ y t ∗ −  r f  ε tM 
(B26)  π t =  π t ∗ − λ(1 + φ) r f  ε tM .
PROOF:
Use (B22) into (2) and (3) after replacing everywhere  f t with  f  t o and solve for π t −  π t ∗ ,  y t −  y t ∗ and  r t −  r t ∗ . Then, the definition of  f  t o immediately implies the 
expression for the nominal interest rate. Now use the nominal interest rate in (2) and 
(3), impose  f t =  f  t ∗ and solve for  π t −  π t ∗ and  y t −  y t ∗ . The expressions stated in the 
proposition are immediately obtained.
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